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bACkGROuND
China’s rise, unresolved maritime 
disputes in Asia Pacific, and the US pivot to 
Asia have led to the re-emergence of Asia-
Pacific as a strategically important region. 
This new found focus has created a growing 
need to understand the regional dynamics in 
a more nuanced way. Given this backdrop, the 
International Strategic and Security Studies 
Programme (ISSSP) of the National Institute 
of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bangalore has 
been engaged in a medium term project 
focusing on China. A primary objective 
of this project was to study the behaviour 
of regional countries in the face of a crisis 
in the Asia Pacific. As a part of this effort, 
ISSSP organised a seminar titled ‘Asia-Pacific 
Power Dynamics: Strategic Implications and 
Options for India’ on March 10, 2014. 
SEMINAR FINDINGS
Based on the proceedings of the seminar 
the following inferences on the behaviour 
and strategies of the major players in the 
Asia Pacific Region can be made.
China
•	 China’s economic performance and its 
military modernization have made it a 
major power in the Asia Pacific Region.
•	 Though there is a great deal of economic 
inter-dependence between China and 
the US, there is great trust deficit that 
spills over into the strategic and military 
domains. This has created a new Cold 
War type situation between the two 
countries.
•	 There was agreement among the 
participants that China is behaving in 
an increasingly assertive and aggressive 
way with its neighbours in the region. 
This assertive behaviour is particularly 
prominent in the East and South China 
seas. This behaviour was directed 
not only at US allies but also at other 
countries in the region.
•	 China’s aggressive behaviour seems to 
have the full support of the Party and 
the PLA. The PLA remains under the 
firm control of the Party. Participants 
felt that this assertive behaviour would 
continue.
•	 China’s relations with prominent US 
allies such as Japan and Philippines have 
become significantly worse following 
a string of maritime incidents. Other 
countries such as Vietnam have also 
been subject to Chinese harassment.
•	 China’s behaviour towards the ASEAN 
group of countries also suggests that it 
thinks it has a dominant power position.
•	 There seems to be a gap between Chinese 
local bullying behaviour and the overall 
strategy that seems to advocate a more 
reasoned rise.
•	 Participants described this variously 
as “psychological flux”, “muscular 
leadership” and “no clear sense of 
direction”.
The seminar proceedings raised a 
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number of questions related to the motives 
behind China’s behaviour. Some questions 
are as follows:
•	 Is China’s increased belligerence based 
on the premise that US power is on the 
decline and that it can now match the 
US at least in the region?
•	 With the presence of “US pivot” and the 
notion of “Air Sea Battle,” does China 
believes that it has in place a strategy 
to deter the US from intervening in the 
region? or
•	 Is the increasing assertiveness based 
on the belief that the US wants to deter 
China from bullying its neighbours 
but will not move towards containing 
China?
•	 By implication does this mean that 
China does not take the “US pivot” and 
the “Air Sea Battle” as a hindrance to or 
a constraint on its actions? or
•	 Is the Chinese behaviour a consequence 
of a gap between the local and global 
strategies or between the tactical and the 
strategic? What are or what could be the 
reasons for this gap? Or
•	 Is China’s assertiveness a part of a 
well thought out integrated approach 
towards the eventual re-establishment 
of China’s dominant position in the 
region?
•	 Though some participants raised the 
question of a new world order with 
China and the US as dominant power 
centres, the issue did not emerge 
as a major point deserving serious 
consideration.
The USA
According to the seminar participants 
the recent US pivot to Asia Pacific region 
could be interpreted in many ways.
•	 It can be seen as a move away from 
a dominant or hegemonic position 
towards a rebalancing position.
•	 It can also be seen as a US response 
to contain a rising China. Many 
participants mentioned that this was the 
position that the Chinese were taking 
in response to the “US pivot” and the 
concept of “Air Sea Battle”.
•	 There seemed to be a broad acceptance 
amongst the participants that the US 
actions were not aimed at containing 
China but rather directed towards 
deterring China’s bullying tactics.
•	 The view that the US sees India as an 
important ally in its rebalancing strategy 
also seemed to find acceptance.
•	 When the sessions on China and the 
US are viewed together, the seminar 
proceedings seemed to suggest 
ambiguities in both Chinese and 
American perceptions regarding each 
other’s motives and intentions in the 
Asia Pacific area. These grey areas could 
sow the seeds for future conflicts in the 
region.
Russia
•	 Russia would like to remain relevant as 
a major power centre in the region. The 
mature status of the European markets 
for oil and gas, and the growth prospects 
for them in the Asia Pacific region 
(especially in China) will force Russia to 
look eastwards rather than westwards. 
If China’s response is positive especially 
in terms of economic investment in 
Russia’s eastern regions, Russia may not 
have any problems in sharing power 
with China, as a part of the new political 
order in the region. 
•	 Developments in Ukraine and their 
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consequences will also move Russia 
closer towards China to counter the 
moves from NATO and the western 
alliance. A Sino-Russian alliance of sorts 
could well happen soon.
Japan
•	 The seminar proceedings suggest that 
Japan is seriously worried about the rise 
of China and its increasing aggressive 
behaviour towards it. It is also worried 
about China’s power and influence over 
a nuclear and missile capable North 
Korea that can be used to threaten and 
coerce Japan.
•	 Japan has responded to these 
developments by strengthening its 
alliance with the US. As a part of this 
alliance it will once again allow US 
bases to operate out of Japan.
•	 It is also improving its defence 
capabilities and if the constitution can 
be amended it is signalling the setting 
up of a self-defence force for the country.
•	 By signing security pacts with Australia 
and India it has also indicated its 
intentions to form alliances with other 
like-minded countries to counter China’s 
aggressive behaviour.
The ASEAN Countries
The ASEAN as a collective body is 
divided on how it should deal with China’s 
increasing assertiveness.
Some fall clearly within the Chinese 
camp while others fall within the US camp 
and many others would like to remain neutral.
•	 Most of the approaches adopted by them 
to build integrated security architecture 
with all the major players in the region 
such as the EAS have not delivered any 
great results so far.
•	 As a consequence, countries are 
pursuing their own approaches when 
dealing with this situation.
•	 Cambodia and Laos appear to be closely 
linked to China.
•	 Indonesia, the largest country of the 
ASEAN is trying to remain neutral by 
providing space to China but also seems 
to be worried about Chinese actions 
in waters close to it. It is looking new 
ways and means in dealing with these 
problems.
•	 Malaysia like Indonesia originally 
favoured a security architecture that 
recognized China’s major role but after 
the spate of maritime incidents, it has 
moved along with the Philippines 
towards a multilateral code of conduct 
approach with the involvement of 
countries like the US and Japan.
•	 Singapore and Thailand are trying to 
work out arrangements which would 
favour the continuity of trade with 
China but also enable them to be linked 
to a security umbrella under the US.
•	 South Korea appears to be moving 
closer to China both in terms of trade 
and also because it believes that China 
can control North Korea. However, 
in case a major conflict breaks out, it 
might still look to the US to guarantee 
security.
•	 Given this large variation in interests, 
it appears unlikely that a grand 
alliance against China can materialize, 
even under US leadership. However 
new security arrangements between 
countries with similar interests that 
may include other major powers are 
already beginning to emerge. This 
may be the trend for the next few 
years.
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India
•	 India does not have a clearly articulated 
strategy for dealing with developments 
in the Asia Pacific region including the 
rise of China. The articulation of such a 
strategy that includes both hard and soft 
power components came out as the top 
Indian priority.
•	 Though Indian and US interests are 
increasingly aligned against China in 
many ways, India should not become 
a formal part of the US rebalance 
strategy. India should also make sure 
that it has the capabilities to deal with 
any problems with China on its own 
without having to depend on other 
countries. 
•	 India should continue to actively engage 
with China in all areas while continuing 
to be watchful about Chinese actions 
and intentions.
•	 India needs to be proactive in its 
approach to the region especially with 
regard to the maritime domain. It must 
exploit emerging opportunities to send 
strong signals to all players, that it 
will preserve and protect its strategic 
interests. The absence of a clear ‘Look 
East’ strategy is currently hampering 
such efforts.
•	 In spite of the many problems within 
ASEAN, India should continue to engage 
actively and constructively with it.
•	 Apart from strengthening bilateral ties 
with countries like Russia, India also 
needs to look at trilateral agreements 
with the countries to strengthen its 
strategic position.
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2.1 INAuGuRAL SESSION
Prof. Rajaram Nagappa, Head of 
International Strategic and Security Studies 
Programme, NIAS opened the conference 
by welcoming attendees and giving a brief 
history of the organization and background 
of the seminar. 
Prof. Nagappa then introduced 
the keynote speaker Ambassador CV 
Ranganathan, Former Indian Ambassador to 
China.
The title of Ambassador CV 
Ranganathan’s keynote talk was 
“Geo-politics of the Asia-Pacific 
Region: Indian Perspective.”
Ambassador Ranganathan started his 
keynote address by stating that it is difficult 
to predict the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific 
region. He highlighted certain geo-political 
trends that would affect the region and how 
they would affect India.
These included the emergence of Jihadi 
movements, the increase in sectarian conflicts 
between Sunnis and Shias and the renewal 
of ties between Iran and the western nations, 
most of which could impact India negatively.
He went on to say that the economic 
rise of China was a reality and ways and 
means may have to be found to keep it in 
check. Resultantly, there is a revival of a new 
kind of cold war between the US and China. 
Doubts were raised about the US capacity 
to lay down rules for conflict resolution in 
the region. Recent developments in Ukraine 
tended to lend some substance to such 
arguments.
He said traditionally China has 
always attempted to exert influence in the 
South China Sea. However, to improve its 
strategic position, China has also increased 
its land links with Central Asia. China 
has often been guilty of exaggerating its 
accomplishments. Recent developments and 
2. SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS
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examples of Chinese assertive behaviour 
suggest that China is currently in a position 
of psychological flux. 
China has so far had a peaceful transition 
due to its collective leadership, which has 
taken up the initiative of rejuvenating China. 
He also emphasized the relevance of using 
Chinese literature for understanding China 
instead of western literature. 
On India-China bilateral relations, he 
highlighted the frequent visits exchanged 
by both the parties and the number of 
declarations that have been signed between 
the two countries at various levels. He spoke 
about Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988. 
He was the first prime minister to pay a 
visit to China in three decades. The visit 
understandably made many of the South 
East Asian countries unhappy. These same 
concerns are visible even today as South 
East Asian countries want India to act in a 
way so as to rebalance China’s rising power 
in the region. As a response, he said, India 
should maintain its neutral position and not 
push itself into issues related to rebalancing. 
India’s current position is such that it cannot 
afford to become a victim of a rebalancing 
strategy. 
He underlined that what India really 
needed to do is to keep track of China’s 
expansion and its relationship with Japan 
and Russia. He also stressed that China 
needs to resolve territorial issues in order 
to improve its engagement with India. The 
Chinese view international relations as an 
area where contradictions are inevitable 
since neighbours cannot be chosen to suit the 
country’s needs. At the end of the address, he 
listed a few options for India. These included 
a stable government in Delhi that motivates 
development, improves governance and 
which emphasises a renewed focus on 
national defence and national strategy. He 
concluded by stating India needs to face 
China with confidence and preparedness.
Dr Arun Vishwanathan, Assistant Professor 
in Strategic and Security Studies proposed a 
vote of thanks for the session and reiterated 
the keynote speaker’s views on China.
2.2 SESSION I: PERSPECTIvES FROM 
ChINA
The session was chaired by Prof. S. 
Chandrashekar, JRD Tata Visiting Professor, 
NIAS. This session dealt with the structural 
dimensions of Asian geopolitics, the impact 
of bipolarity and multi-polarity, anxieties 
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related to power transitions making for 
an uncertain future, and the maritime 
dimension. 
Papers were presented by Mr. Jayadev 
Ranade, President, Centre for China Analysis 
and Strategy; Member, National Security 
Advisory Board (NSAB); former Additional 
Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government 
of India; and Distinguished Fellow, IPCS); 
Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli, Professor, Centre 
for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru 
University and Mr. Mohan Guruswamy, 
Chairman and founder of Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, New Delhi.
The title of Mr. Jayadev Ranade’s 
talk was “Asia-Pacific: Perspective 
from China.”
Mr. Jayadev Ranade started his 
presentation by quoting China’s Ambassador 
who had stated, that while the US is a super 
power in the Asia Pacific, China is indigenous 
to the region and will continue to be there for 
a long time.
He went on to say that it is important 
to keep in mind that the Chinese have 
always had a trust deficit with the US 
which has become worse since 1989. Like 
most countries the Chinese use a mix of 
cooperation, competition and confrontation 
in their relations with other countries.
Xi Jinping at the 18th National Party 
Congress put forth the concept of the 
“Chinese Dream,” that seemed to express 
the collective desire of the country to have 
a muscular vision of the future. Mr. Ranade 
stated that this vision was not an individual 
aspiration of the leader but was in fact a 
collective reflection of the Chinese leadership 
that China is ready to reclaim its rightful 
position in the world especially in the South 
China Sea and the Asia-Pacific region. 
Though China has grown in economic 
and military terms, Xi Jinping has ensured 
that the Party retains control over both the 
economy as well as the Security Apparatus 
including the modernisation efforts with 
respect to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 
While the members of the party cell have 
expanded the strength of PLA particularly 
the Navy, they have also simultaneously 
brought it under the control of the Party. 
Many see this as a power consolidation move 
by Xi Jinping. According to Mr. Ranade, the 
PLA today is under direct party control and is 
not independent of the party. This in turn has 
encouraged Beijing to push for sovereignty, 
territorial rights, and Maoist indoctrination.
China has been extremely 
confrontational in the South China Sea. The 
leaders are extremely clear with their vision 
on issues concerning territorial claims. Xi 
Jinping has also gained approval in managing 
the various crises that have arisen as a result 
of an increasingly assertive territorial claims 
policy. In the speaker’s assessment, China is 
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likely to continue to be assertive in pushing 
its territorial and sovereignty claims. This 
was reflected in China’s recent posture when 
it confronted both the Philippines and Japan. 
It has also adopted a policy of no contact 
with Japan although people to people contact 
and bilateral trade continue. This reflects the 
unanimity of the party leadership on such 
issues. In fact, the Chinese have also signalled 
a warning to Japan by adopting a stringent 
stand of ‘no policy exchange’ till Shinzo Abe 
(Prime Minister of Japan) leaves office. 
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has 
made it clear there would be no change or 
compromise on this matter or in the stand the 
Chinese have taken. Wang Yi has even made it 
clear that any intervention from the US would 
not be entertained or encouraged in any manner. 
According to the speaker there is no way the 
Chinese are going to comprise on the issue.
Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli’s talk 
was on “PLA Modernisation and 
the Future of Asia-Pacific Security 
Environment.”
Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli began the 
talk by expressing his views on Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), Chinese 
military capabilities and its dispute with 
Japan over Senkaku Island. 
According to him, relations between 
China and Japan have witnessed a setback 
since 2010 over their claims on Senkaku 
Island. The implications are that the US 
presence in the region will be determined by 
Japan and China’s actions with respect to the 
island. 
The speaker went on to explain the 
significance of the South China Sea, whose 
waters account for 40 percent of trade in the 
region. As a result, China is pushing for an 
increasing role in ASEAN. In spite of China’s 
assertive posture in the region, there is no 
clarity on its strategic direction.
Although the direction that China has 
been taking can be confusing, the expression 
of its capability has been definite. The PLA 
today is a serious force with significant 
capabilities. And there is no doubt that 
China is contesting for power in the pacific 
region as it has established an Air Defence 
Identification Zone (ADIZ). However, the 
speaker ruled out the creation of similar 
ADIZ in the South China Sea since the 
Chinese want to maintain cordial relations in 
the area because of its importance as a trade 
route. 
As per the 18th National Party Congress 
held on November 15, 2012, the Chinese 
have announced that the PLA will defence 
its interest in the region. As quoted in the 
12th Chinese Five Year Plan, the PLA would 
conduct training, military preparations, 
sharing of military information and exercise 
training with foreign military forces. The 
Chinese have also been subjugating people 
in the regions of Taiwan and Tibet. China’s 
presence in Taiwan has led to an increase of 
1% in its GDP. In Tibet, the subjugation efforts 
are seen in the 29 military exercises that they 
have carried out. Military modernization 
and security over the peninsulas have also 
increased and training exercises have been 
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conducted. In the words of Prof. Kondapalli, 
China’s military modernization has been 
substantial, particularly in terms of the 
hardware. However, in terms of software the 
country still faces some problems.
Mr. Mohan Guruswamy spoke on 
“Economically How’s China Doing 
and What it Means for Others?”
Mr. Mohan Guruswamy began by 
emphasizing that people are important for 
economic growth of a country. Unfortunately, 
the young population in China is declining 
and this has become a cause of concern. 
China is on the path of an ageing society 
and this could drastically curtail its growth 
trajectory. 
Mr. Guruswamy stated that though 
China has been growing at a fast rate, its 
ageing population would eventually slow 
down its rate of growth. The young workforce 
that had made the largest contribution to the 
economy would soon become old. Currently, 
China has 60 million people who are over 60 
years of age. He stated that the CPC’s one 
child policy had not only adversely affected 
the fertility rate but has also been responsible 
for the country’s population growth targets 
not being met. China’s desperate attempts to 
keep its economy running while at the same 
time taking care of growing consumption 
levels has proved to be a formidable 
challenge. 
He also said that with a large number 
of young people opting for higher education, 
China’s young working population has been 
rapidly declining. China has to therefore 
re-strategize its policy to factor in these 
demographic trends that will impact its 
GDP growth. Based on some assumptions 
that are reasonable, countries like India, the 
Philippines and Thailand would be growing 
at a greater pace by 2050. This in turn could 
affect the Chinese economy. Given the 
current state, it looks like China is following 
Japan’s footsteps both in terms of work and 
demography. Adding to the Chinese woes, he 
said the US, which has been one of the largest 
importers and consumers of Chinese goods, 
has seen a fall in its consumption level. This 
once again raises concerns for China.
In the discussion, the following issues 
were discussed. The lesson India can learn 
from the Chinese experience, the possibility 
of India building allies in the region, 
command and control mechanisms in China 
and the prospect of China going in for 
deterrent patrols.
2.3 SESSION II: PERSPECTIvES FROM 
ThE uS AND RuSSIA
The session was chaired by Dr. D. Suba 
Chandran, Director, Institute of Peace and 
Conflict Studies (IPCS). This session dealt 
with perspectives from the US and Russia on 
the changing power dynamics in the Asia-
Pacific Region. 
The questions posed to the speakers 
included the following:
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•	 What would constitute of the Asia 
Pacific region?
•	 How would the major powers react to 
the emerging geo-politics of the region? 
What would be the consequences of 
such reactions?
•	 What are the factors that may influence 
the US to work towards bringing about 
a consensus on Asia-Pacific? 
•	 To what extent would Russia’s attempt 
to re-engage in the region impact the 
notion of Indo-Pacific? 
•	 What compels Russia to consider itself a 
major stakeholder in the region? 
The panellists were Prof. Chintamani 
Mahapatra, Professor, Centre for American 
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University and 
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar, Former 
Ambassador to USSR.
Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra spoke 
on “The perspective from the US” 
towards the emerging developments 
in the Asia Pacific Region.
Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra 
commenced his talk by saying that economic 
forecasts were all based on one fundamental 
assumption – that all other factors remained 
the same. The reality in Asia, he said, was 
that the US would always be around. For 
over two years, the Obama Administration 
has been articulating a new strategy for its 
future role in Asia. 
In fact this US pivot towards Asia is very 
evident since 2008 when the former Secretary 
of State Hilary Clinton had articulated this 
both in her writings as well as in her speeches. 
Prof. Mahapatra then went on to state 
that within the US, this new approach to 
the Asia-Pacific region was articulated in 
different forums in different ways and from 
different perspectives. Some have viewed it as 
a US move away from its stance of hegemony 
towards a stance of regional rebalancing 
after the negative experience of unwinnable 
wars in the past decade. Others consider this 
as a response to the rise of China. There are 
also some who see this as the US effort of 
revisiting and re-engaging with the region 
due to the Bush Administration’s negligence 
of the Asia-Pacific. 
Finally, he mentioned that some 
consider this ‘pivot’ as the US move to 
catch up with changes in the region. As 
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a result, some call it ‘pivot to Asia’; some 
‘Asian Rebalancing Strategy’ and others 
call it ‘America’s return to Asia’. Whatever 
may be the label of Obama’s new initiatives 
towards Asia; it reflects a renewed focus of 
the US on the Asia-Pacific region that has 
been under a shadow for over a decade 
during which the Bush Administration and 
the Obama Administration were engaged in 
executing two wars in South and West Asia 
(Afghanistan, 2001 and Iraq, 2003). 
During this time while the two American 
Administrations were busy fighting terrorists 
and insurgents, a paradigm shift had taken 
place with the rise of China as the predominant 
player in the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, 
most American allies had found in China not 
only a major trade partner but also an investor 
in their domestic economies.
China made great use of its new 
economic muscle to expand its nuclear, 
missile and naval capabilities. It also soon 
buried its concept of peaceful rise and 
began to make assertive in its territorial and 
maritime claims. In order to weaken China’s 
influence in the Asia Pacific, President 
Barack Obama had to announce his Asia 
Rebalancing Strategy. Prof. Mahapatra also 
mentioned that the Pentagon had provided 
evidence of the pivot strategy through its 
announcement that henceforth 60% of naval 
resources would be deployed in the Asia-
Pacific region. China’s classification of this as 
a ‘new containment strategy’ was countered 
by the US which stated that in view of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership already in place, 
there was no ‘pivot’, but only a ‘rebalancing’. 
Prof. Mahapatra then reiterated that in 
terms of strategy, the objective of the US is 
not to ‘contain’ China, but to ‘deter’ it from 
bullying its neighbours. As a corollary, 
therefore, the US should try and ensure that 
the two militaries, particularly the navies, 
should operate closely. In this context, he 
said, India finds a key place in the new 
American strategy for certain valid reasons. 
The enhanced bilateral defence and security 
cooperation between India and the US in 
recent years had in fact altered the dominant 
paradigm of their relationship. 
The US wanted to help India grow as a 
major global player and a security provider 
in the Indian Ocean. He highlighted that both 
President George Bush and President Barack 
Obama had welcomed India’s ‘Look East 
Policy’ and also encouraged India to elevate 
this policy to an ‘Engage East Policy’. He 
also said that the US Defence Secretary, Leon 
Panetta, had made it clear during his visit to 
India that India would be a ‘linchpin’ in the 
American Rebalancing Strategy in Asia. This 
provides additional evidence of the altered 
US approach towards India.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar 
focused on emerging developments 
in the Asia-Pacific Region from a 
Russian perspective. 
Amb. M K Bhadrakumar began by 
stating that he would concentrate mainly 
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on the issues related to Russia vis-à-vis 
the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific region. 
He added that this had acquired increased 
relevance in view of the developments in 
Ukraine. He said that the Russian strategy 
in Asia-Pacific is full of ambivalence and this 
could be very useful to India. 
The Russian perspective on the 
developments in the region and their 
implications for Russia had not changed 
significantly. In his view, Russia faces a 
problem of differing perceptions in different 
regions. In Europe, the Russians are seen 
as Tartars / Tatars, but in Asia Russians are 
seen as Western Europeans. He stated that 
developments in Ukraine show that Russia 
is caught between Europe and a rising 
China, in its strategic calculations. China’s 
rise, and also South Korea’s rise, presents 
the world with an alternative model to that 
presented by Russia. Russia would also like 
to be as relevant as before to the two Koreas. 
According to him, the Asian paradigm in 
Russia is very important as it no longer wants 
to be marginalised. Economically, Russia 
is dependent on the Asian markets and the 
Asian-Pacific region is directly linked to it. 
According to him, Russia is interested 
in the Asian oil and gas markets. Hence 
the Asia-Pacific strategy is also linked to 
the overall Russian strategy. Russia is also 
Europe’s primary energy supplier. In his 
view, the best days of the European market for 
Russian gas are clearly over. As an alternate 
market, China has a 12% growth rate for gas 
consumption and double the rate for Russian 
food exports to China. He stated that Russia 
shares strong relations with China that foster 
energy links. It is also moving forward with 
stronger relations with Japan. For Russia, 
the global strategic balance is a trump card. 
This is central to the Russian view of the US-
China-Russia balance in Asia-Pacific.
Amb. Bhadrakumar was of the view 
that the security situation has deteriorated in 
the Asia-Pacific region and relations between 
the different actors are both complex and 
diverse. There is an asymmetry in the US 
attitude towards the countries in the region. 
While the US and Russia has parity of nuclear 
forces, China and Russia do not share nuclear 
parity. Eight of the fourteen US missile 
submarines are now in the Pacific. China’s 
relationships with the US and Russia remain 
ambiguous. The US-Russian relations also 
saw its lowest point in between on Ukraine 
issue. He referred to this situation as “Cold 
Confrontation”. The major partners of Russia 
are more interested in commerce. Thus at 
this strategic juncture Moscow is facing 
a dilemma. He further stated the Russian 
elite perception of China is full of contrast. 
Therefore, for Ambassador Bhadrakumar 
Russia’s attitude towards China is to be 
understood through its silences. 
In the backdrop of European 
developments he also spoke about the 
ambiguous nature of the EU-Russian 
relationship and the notion that Russia was 
a part of the European civilization is largely 
a Western idea. He concluded the talk by 
saying that it is better for Russia if Chinese 
investment flows to its Eastern Regions, 
China joins the Arms Control process, and 
that it limits the number of Chinese ICBMs 
and IRBMs, in the hope that this will stop the 
US from deploying Missile Defence systems 
in the Asia-Pacific region.
In the discussions that followed a 
number of issues were discussed. These 
included: the American move to join the East 
Asia summit, the possibilities of a Russia-led 
Eurasian Union, the stand that Russia would 
take if there is a conflict in the South China 
Sea and US expectations from India with 
regard to rebalancing.
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2.4 SESSION III: PERSPECTIvES FROM 
SOuThEAST AND EAST ASIA
This session was chaired by Vice 
Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar, Adjunct 
Faculty, NIAS. The purpose was to examine 
how countries in Southeast Asia and East 
Asia perceive the changing geopolitics in the 
Asia-Pacific region.
Papers were presented by Ambassador 
Hemant Krishan Singh, Former Ambassador 
to Japan and Indonesia & Chair Professor, 
ICRIER-Wadhwani US Chair and Prof. K. 
V. Kesavan, Distinguished Fellow, Observer 
Research Foundation.
The chair introduced the session by 
posing a set of challenges to the speakers. 
The first challenge is that with the coming of 
a new power - China, the immediate reaction 
is to rewrite the rule book. While this might 
happen the relevant question to ask is how 
is it done? 
The second challenge is with the 
increasing competition for access to resource 
and the commensurate building up of forces 
to implement various strategies such as 
access denial etc. Apparently China’s larger 
game plan now includes protecting sea 
lines of communication and areas of interest 
including vast seas that have disputes. By 
taking measures to protect these, China is 
upping the ante. 
The creation of ADIZ by China - a 
practice adopted earlier by the West and 
other countries - has no legal backing and 
presents the third challenge. Even if this 
is carried out there is a principle that one’s 
ADIZ does not overlap with the ADIZ areas 
of others because control in such situations 
would be difficult. He also emphasised that 
the prognosis that a surprise attack by China 
is possible in the present circumstances is 
absurd.
Amb. Hemant Krishan Singh spoke 
about the important issues that 
Southeast Asian countries are facing 
today. 
Amb. Hemant Krishan Singh spoke 
about ideas such as post-cold war power 
dynamics in the region and prospects for a 
new regional security order. 
He stressed that in the post-cold war era, 
ASEAN led initiatives to establish dialogue 
forums approached security as a cooperative 
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and inclusive venture. This was a change 
from traditional security arrangements such 
as the US led pivot and their hub and spoke 
system. 
The ASEAN approach had coexisted 
with US led approaches and had served as 
a stabilising force. This approach has helped 
in managing the stresses and strains related 
to order and stability in Southeast Asia. The 
EAS which came into being after 20 years of 
difficult negotiations sought to bring about 
integration in Asia. It began in the 1990s and 
ended up with the inclusion of India. It was 
intended to move beyond a geographically 
delimited regional community based on 
ASEAN+3 model. In his view, after its 
formation in 2005, the progress of the EAS 
is marginal. It has only assumed a very 
limited soft security role and is yet to reach 
its potential.
In the last few years, the far reaching 
changes in the strategic weight of the different 
players within and between the region and 
other major power centres of the world, have 
heightened the scale and complexity of the 
security challenges facing the region and the 
world. There are clear signs of intensifying 
regional competition between states that 
include security challenges as well.  In his view, 
economic interdependence cannot by itself 
ensure peace. On the contrary, the continued 
economic progress in the region depends 
on a reliable stable geopolitical order. There 
is therefore a need for multilateral security 
and economic arrangements to facilitate the 
socialization of security issues and provide 
space for collective and cooperative security 
actions.
While highlighting the major challenges 
in the region, Ambassador Singh stated 
that unlike the states of Europe that were 
relatively homogenous, the states in the region 
exhibited great diversity in their political 
characteristics. This posed significantly greater 
complexities for building a security order. 
Powers in the region have varying capabilities. 
As a consequence, there is a large stress on 
the security of the region. There is also an 
ambiguity about the US rebalance for its allies. 
This ambiguity seems to provide too much 
strategic reassurance to China for the pursuit 
of a policy that could result in instability in the 
region. The uncertainty is about the US pivot 
and whether it can become a stabilising force 
in the region. 
The main challenges in the South 
and East Asian regions arise from China’s 
territorial assertions, its military upgradation 
and the unilateral course of actions that it is 
increasingly pursuing. Clear evidence for 
this can be seen from the stalled process for 
the working out of a Code of Conduct in the 
South China Sea. All these are symptoms of 
China’s assertive rise. 
In view of these developments, the 
various states in the region are reassessing 
their regional security matrices. For 
example, Australia which was always Asia 
Pacific in nature, pioneered APEC and APC, 
and recently started developing an Indo-
Pacific orientation. As a result of Australia’s 
intervention, there is a tension between 
Indonesia and Australia which is similar 
to the Cold War. The Chinese have taken 
advantage of this and are using Indonesian 
waters for their naval exercises. This reveals 
the difficulties in integrating Australia into 
the regional security framework. He also 
spoke about military manoeuvres by China 
in the Indian Ocean as a cause of concern. 
Indonesia’s response to regional security 
issues can be summarized as a dynamic 
equilibrium i.e. building systems based on 
trust and confidence, create webs of multiple 
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ASEAN led frameworks, avoid grand 
coalitions and provide space to regional 
powers. 
On Malaysia, Ambassador Singh 
stated that Kuala Lumpur had for many 
years favoured a regional architecture that 
gave prominence to China. Along with the 
Philippines, they brought a code of conduct 
in the South China Sea. Malaysia and the 
Philippines have become strong proponents 
of multilateral frameworks including new 
security arrangement with the US and with 
Japan. Cambodia and Laos are more aligned 
with China on security architecture. 
Similarly, Singapore and Thailand hedge 
their approach towards China on economic 
matters but favour security arrangement 
with the US. With Korea moving closer to 
China and moving away from Japan due to 
historical reasons, there are difficulties for the 
US in forming a North-East Asian security 
arrangement. In the end, he stressed that India 
can support any security architecture in this 
region if there is a renunciation of coercive 
measures in the settlement of disputes.
Prof. Kesavan spoke on Japan’s 
Perspective on the Changing Power 
Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region 
that included South East, North East 
and East Asia. 
According to Prof. Kesavan, Southeast 
Asia is experiencing major economic, 
scientific and technological developments. 
He highlighted the economic development 
of India and China which is dramatic and the 
effects of which are felt all over the world. 
There are both positive and negative 
trends emerging in the Asia-Pacific region. 
On the positive side, the region is integrating 
very fast. There has been increasing economic 
interdependence. Countries are trading 
more with each other and they have formed 
APEC etc. These testify to a large degree 
of dependence that has been buttressed 
by partnership and free trade agreements. 
However, on the flip side, the region is beset 
with problems. These include territorial 
disputes, a wide diversity of political systems, 
and economic disparities. Increased military 
spending by the countries in the region and 
the rise of an expansionist China bring in 
additional sources of friction and conflict. In 
addition, Japan is bothered by North Korea’s 
brinkmanship and the emergence of China 
as a strong military and economic power has 
contributed to the geostrategic shift towards 
the region. 
While forecasting future scenarios, the 
speaker argued that by 2030 there may be 
a major power transition with China likely 
to replace the US as the strongest power 
in the region. Japan is concerned about 
this possibility especially since China is 
the largest trading partner of most of the 
countries in the region and it has adopted 
an increasingly assertive posture towards 
Japan. He also stated that Japan was very 
concerned about China’s influence over 
North Korea and its nuclear programme. He 
was of the view that any measure to tackle 
China needs to have both a competitive and 
cooperative component. In this context, he 
said Shinzo Abe’s victory in 2012 and his 
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further victory in the upper house election in 
July 2013, has contributed towards internal 
political stability and it might be very useful 
for revamping the Japanese economy. 
On Japan’s strategies for Asia-Pacific, he 
highlighted three major areas for appropriate 
measures to address the challenges from 
China and North Korea. First and foremost, 
Japan believes its security alliance with the 
US would be the cornerstone of Japanese 
diplomacy in the coming years. It therefore 
supported American rebalancing in Asia-
Pacific, hoping that Trans-Pacific Partnership 
materialises. The second component is the 
realignment related to military bases which 
appear to be smooth now that the revision 
of the 1997 security guidelines have been 
agreed to by Japan and the US. Japan under 
Abe is keen to enhance and promote the 
alliance with the US. The third area Abe has 
identified is to develop a reliable military 
force. More importantly, Abe has established 
a National Security Council. He has also 
brought out Japan’s second national security 
strategy along with Japan’s national defence 
promotional guidelines. 
According to Prof. Kesavan, Japan 
wants to have its own constitution without 
or at least an amendment to article 9 so that it 
can develop its own defence force. Linked to 
this is the issue of Japan exercising collective 
self-defence. However, Abe faces pressure 
from the coalition partners who are dead 
against amending the constitution and the 
notion of collective self-defence. Because of 
this opposition, Japan has so far not been 
able to act on collective self-defence. He also 
talked about security arrangements that 
Japan was establishing with other countries 
of the region. Japan has signed bilateral 
agreements with India and Australia that 
exclude both China and the US. 
In the discussions that followed a 
number of issues were discussed. Among 
others these included the emerging security 
architecture; rebalancing, Japan’s strategy 
and Post-Ukraine developments in the Asia 
Pacific region.
2.5 SESSION Iv: PERSPECTIvES FROM 
INDIA
The session was chaired by Rear 
Admiral (Retd.) Raja Menon, Distinguished 
Fellow, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies 
and the National Maritime Foundation. 
The session looked at the role of India—an 
important stakeholder—in the Asia-Pacific 
region and assessed the consequences of 
changing geopolitics in the region. Some of 
the questions that were raised by the Chair 
are as follows: 
•	 To what extent would the US pivot 
to Asia determine the dynamics for 
countries such as India, China, US, 
Japan and other states in the region? 
•	 To what extent would an alliance 
formation (with countries having 
similar geopolitical interests) serve 
India’s interests? 
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•	 From New Delhi’s perspectives, what 
degree of threat is posed by China’s 
technological advancement in the Asia-
Pacific region? 
•	 Can the tensions in South China Sea spill 
over to Eastern Indian Ocean (say Bay of 
Bengal) or the Line of Actual Control?
Papers in fourth session were presented 
by Prof. S.D. Muni, Distinguished Fellow, 
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses 
(IDSA) and Ambassador Leela Ponappa, 
former Ambassador of India, former Deputy 
National Security Advisor and Secretary of 
the National Security Council Secretariat.
Prof. S.D. Muni presented his views 
on ‘India and the Changing Power 
Dynamics Asia-Pacific’ 
Prof. S.D. Muni began his talk by 
offering an overview of the current regional 
situation. According to him, Asia-Pacific is a 
hot spot of competition and rivalry. 
ASEAN, which has limited unity among 
its members and ethnic polarisation in the 
region, has added to the already present 
competition and rivalry in the region. He 
highlighted three major sources of potential 
conflicts in the region, which are the Sino-
US rivalry, the Sino-Japan rivalry and the 
maritime disputes in the South China Sea.  
Washington’s pivot to Asia is driven by 
its desire to re-assert global dominance. He 
stated that the US is down at the moment but 
not out. One sees China being assertive but it 
is also engaging with the region and with the 
United States. China is directing its efforts 
towards wooing India and Indonesia. It is 
not difficult to recognise that of late China 
has become relatively communicative if not 
softer on issues. This is reflected in China’s 
willingness for a nuclear dialogue with India, 
the establishment of a code of conduct on 
borders, efforts towards maritime security 
etc. Even with regard to ASEAN, China has 
become softer and is willing to negotiate a 
code of conduct.
Prof. Muni went on to say that in view 
of periodic problems between the players in 
the region the potential for conflict cannot 
be ruled out. There is a lot of scepticism 
among ASEAN members and neighbouring 
countries about Washington’s ability to 
help Japan in case of a crisis with China. He 
also talked about other problems that have 
plagued the region such as ASEAN countries 
failure to negotiate amicably on bilateral or 
multilateral issues. This is mainly because 
every member in the ASEAN grouping has 
a different way. This also highlights the 
fact that there is little unity within ASEAN 
members. He argued that ASEAN way is 
a Thai-way of functioning which implies 
that it will compromise with the strongest 
power because of its own constraints. There 
is a rising wave of nationalism in China and 
Japan, which will further complicate the 
coming future.
Given this situation Prof. Muni then 
underlined what India could do. In his view, 
Asia-Pacific is a region where India will 
have to be very active. He said that India 
needs to take advantage of economic and 
strategic opportunities opened by the hot-
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spots. India’s activities in Andaman and 
Nicobar are a good example of the route 
India should follow. ASEAN should be kept 
as an anchor. He asserted that ASEAN is only 
a good façade for diplomatic engagements. 
Despite its weaknesses, India should not 
ignore it. India should engage with ASEAN 
more constructively and productively. In 
his view, India should aim for trilateral 
agreement with Southeast Asian neighbours 
like Myanmar, Thailand etc. in line with 
its maritime cooperation agreement with 
Sri Lanka and Maldives. India should also 
engage actively with other important and 
interested countries and participate in 
platforms such as the India-Korea-Japan 
forum and the India-Australia forum. 
Additionally, Prof. Muni averred that 
India should not shy away from engaging 
with China, specifically in relation to China’s 
efforts towards the revival of the Silk Road. 
Initially, India was not interested in the 
Kunming Initiative but is now happy to 
participate. Such as change is welcomed and 
India should continue to follow this path 
and not alienate itself. India should also 
engage with socio-economic issues in this 
region. As a stable democracy India should 
help strengthen the democratic forces in 
countries like Myanmar and Thailand. In 
the end, Professor stated that Russia looks a 
promising ally even in the Asia-Pacific and 
therefore India should try and work more 
keenly and vigorously on that relationship. 
Ambassador Leela Ponappa spoke 
on ‘New Power Dynamics in Asia-
Pacific: Strategic Implications and 
Options for India.’
Amb. Leela Ponappa argued that before 
delving into the core issues of the topic, it is 
important to look at the basics of the issue. 
She stated that it is worth questioning what 
constitutes the Asia-Pacific or for that matter 
the Indo-Pacific region. 
China opposed the term, ‘Indo-Pacific’. 
While some say that Indo-Pacific has a 
reference to India, specifically the India 
Ocean, others raise the question whether it 
implies a connection to Indonesia or Eurasia. 
It is interesting to note that the term 
‘South Asia’ came into use in the 1980s 
eventually leading to the concept of SAARC. 
Further she said there is another question 
that one needs to ponder over. What should 
India’s world view be? She answered that the 
world view should be dependent on the position 
the country enjoys. There will also always be 
overlapping domains in this regard such as our 
interests in various areas and organisations like 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, East 
Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum etc. She 
advocated that India also needs to establish 
and work on a security dialogue with the Gulf. 
India’s geography is diverse. Its geographical 
connections range from China to Antarctica 
and the Bay of Bengal etc.
Regarding China, she was of view that 
any rising power would be assertive as that 
is the norm. The question worth asking is 
that how should India cope with China’s 
rise? The pointer to answering this question 
is that we should think strategically and not 
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culturally. To illustrate this point she said 
that India raised two strike corps for use in 
the border region. The link between this and 
the clarity of the goal in the current scenario 
is not very evident. She expressed that the 
general lethargy and problems with India 
has got nothing to do with democracy. It 
is the inability to communicate ones goals 
clearly. The issue in India remains that any 
talk bearing a military dimension, security or 
any defence related issues in foreign policy 
deliberations raise hackles. 
India vouches on its soft power but it is 
essential to realize that soft power only helps 
if you have hard power. India has its own 
ambivalence regarding its views on issues 
and its role. She emphasized that India needs 
to articulate a strategic doctrine. 
Talking of the world view, she said New 
Delhi should also look at both the resources 
at its command and opportunities that the 
resources may offer when engaging with other 
countries. India offers a lot of scholarships to 
Buddhist monks in Thailand to come to India 
and learn Pali. This helps in increasing soft 
power. However by focusing only on that, we 
lose out on other important aspects such as 
giving scholarships to Thai students to come 
to India and study engineering, IT etc. In 
the same vein, when the idea of establishing 
the Andaman & Nicobar command was 
proposed, India became defensive and 
guilty. These instances showcase the need of 
having a high degree of clarity on strategic 
and political issues. India should also focus 
on military cooperation with other countries 
at bilateral and multilateral levels. We can 
negotiate on joint operations and intelligence 
sharing as well.
How does India perceive the South East 
Asian region? The region is evolving but 
does India’s Look East Policy change along 
with the evolution. Amb. Ponappa said India 
should look beyond the traditional focus 
on soft power, economics and investment. 
As a result of the changing geopolitical 
environment, if New Delhi does not adopt 
an active strategy and provide resources for 
implementation, it will not be able to make 
use of the opportunities available.
In relation to the specifics of the US Pivot 
to Asia, she presented the view that one needs 
to realise that US-China equation exists on its 
own and is not entirely dependent on India, 
as some would like to perceive it. Talking 
about alliance formations, she felt it remains 
difficult to predict the way India would 
take. However it is important for New Delhi 
to build partnerships. Her final statement 
was that India needs to develop her own 
capabilities and not rely on another country 
or set of countries for any assistance.
At the end of the seminar, the convenor 
Dr. M. Mayilvaganan proposed a vote of 
thanks. He acknowledged the hard work and 
effort of the organizing committee apart from 
thanking all the chairpersons, presenters, 
rapporteurs, and delegates in making the 
event a success.
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Based on the proceedings of the seminar 
the following inferences on the behaviour 
and strategies of the major players in the 
Asia Pacific Region can be made.
China
•	 China’s economic performance and its 
military modernization have made it a 
major power in the Asia Pacific Region.
•	 Though there is a great deal of economic 
inter-dependence between China and 
the US, there is great trust deficit that 
spills over into the strategic and military 
domains. This has created a new Cold 
War type situation between the two 
countries.
•	 There was agreement among the 
participants that China is behaving in 
an increasingly assertive and aggressive 
way with its neighbours in the region. 
This assertive behaviour is particularly 
prominent in the East and South China 
seas. This behaviour was directed 
not only at US allies but also at other 
countries in the region.
•	 China’s aggressive behaviour seems to 
have the full support of the Party and 
the PLA. The PLA remains under the 
firm control of the Party. Participants 
felt that this assertive behaviour would 
continue.
•	 China’s relations with prominent US 
allies such as Japan and Philippines have 
become significantly worse following 
a string of maritime incidents. Other 
countries such as Vietnam have also 
been subject to Chinese harassment.
•	 China’s behaviour towards the ASEAN 
group of countries also suggests that it 
thinks it has a dominant power position.
•	 There seems to be a gap between Chinese 
local bullying behaviour and the overall 
strategy that seems to advocate a more 
reasoned rise.
•	 Participants described this variously 
as “psychological flux”, “muscular 
leadership” and “no clear sense of 
direction”.
The seminar proceedings raised a 
number of questions related to the motives 
behind China’s behaviour. Some questions 
are as follows:
•	 Is China’s increased belligerence based 
on the premise that US power is on the 
decline and that it can now match the 
US at least in the region?
•	 With the presence of “US pivot” and the 
notion of “Air Sea Battle,” does China 
believes that it has in place a strategy 
to deter the US from intervening in the 
region? or
•	 Is the increasing assertiveness based 
on the belief that the US wants to deter 
China from bullying its neighbours 
but will not move towards containing 
China?
•	 By implication does this mean that 
China does not take the “US pivot” and 
the “Air Sea Battle” as a hindrance to or 
a constraint on its actions? or
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•	 Is the Chinese behaviour a consequence 
of a gap between the local and global 
strategies or between the tactical and the 
strategic? What are or what could be the 
reasons for this gap? Or
•	 Is China’s assertiveness a part of a 
well thought out integrated approach 
towards the eventual re-establishment 
of China’s dominant position in the 
region?
•	 Though some participants raised the 
question of a new world order with 
China and the US as dominant power 
centres, the issue did not emerge 
as a major point deserving serious 
consideration.
The USA
According to the seminar participants 
the recent US pivot to Asia Pacific region 
could be interpreted in many ways.
•	 It can be seen as a move away from 
a dominant or hegemonic position 
towards a rebalancing position.
•	 It can also be seen as a US response 
to contain a rising China. Many 
participants mentioned that this was the 
position that the Chinese were taking 
in response to the “US pivot” and the 
concept of “Air Sea Battle”.
•	 There seemed to be a broad acceptance 
amongst the participants that the US 
actions were not aimed at containing 
China but rather directed towards 
deterring China’s bullying tactics.
•	 The view that the US sees India as an 
important ally in its rebalancing strategy 
also seemed to find acceptance.
•	 When the sessions on China and the 
US are viewed together, the seminar 
proceedings seemed to suggest 
ambiguities in both Chinese and 
American perceptions regarding each 
other’s motives and intentions in the 
Asia Pacific area. These grey areas could 
sow the seeds for future conflicts in the 
region.
Russia
•	 Russia would like to remain relevant as 
a major power centre in the region. The 
mature status of the European markets 
for oil and gas, and the growth prospects 
for them in the Asia Pacific region 
(especially in China) will force Russia to 
look eastwards rather than westwards. 
If China’s response is positive especially 
in terms of economic investment in 
Russia’s eastern regions, Russia may not 
have any problems in sharing power 
with China, as a part of the new political 
order in the region. 
•	 Developments in Ukraine and their 
consequences will also move Russia 
closer towards China to counter the 
moves from NATO and the western 
alliance. A Sino-Russian alliance of sorts 
could well happen soon.
Japan
•	 The seminar proceedings suggest that 
Japan is seriously worried about the rise 
of China and its increasing aggressive 
behaviour towards it. It is also worried 
about China’s power and influence over 
a nuclear and missile capable North 
Korea that can be used to threaten and 
coerce Japan.
•	 Japan has responded to these 
developments by strengthening its 
alliance with the US. As a part of this 
alliance it will once again allow US 
bases to operate out of Japan.
•	 It is also improving its defence 
capabilities and if the constitution can 
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be amended it is signalling the setting 
up of a self-defence force for the country.
•	 By signing security pacts with Australia 
and India it has also indicated its 
intentions to form alliances with other 
like-minded countries to counter China’s 
aggressive behaviour.
ThE ASEAN COuNTRIES
The ASEAN as a collective body is 
divided on how it should deal with China’s 
increasing assertiveness.
Some fall clearly within the Chinese 
camp while others fall within the US camp 
and many others would like to remain 
neutral.
•	 Most of the approaches adopted by them 
to build integrated security architecture 
with all the major players in the region 
such as the EAS have not delivered any 
great results so far.
•	 As a consequence, countries are 
pursuing their own approaches when 
dealing with this situation.
•	 Cambodia and Laos appear to be closely 
linked to China.
•	 Indonesia, the largest country of the 
ASEAN is trying to remain neutral by 
providing space to China but also seems 
to be worried about Chinese actions 
in waters close to it. It is looking new 
ways and means in dealing with these 
problems.
•	 Malaysia like Indonesia originally 
favoured a security architecture that 
recognized China’s major role but after 
the spate of maritime incidents, it has 
moved along with the Philippines 
towards a multilateral code of conduct 
approach with the involvement of 
countries like the US and Japan.
•	 Singapore and Thailand are trying to 
work out arrangements which would 
favour the continuity of trade with 
China but also enable them to be linked 
to a security umbrella under the US.
•	 South Korea appears to be moving 
closer to China both in terms of trade 
and also because it believes that China 
can control North Korea. However, in 
case a major conflict breaks out, it might 
still look to the US to guarantee security.
•	 Given this large variation in interests, 
it appears unlikely that a grand 
alliance against China can materialize, 
even under US leadership. However 
new security arrangements between 
countries with similar interests that may 
include other major powers are already 
beginning to emerge. This may be the 
trend for the next few years.
India
•	 India does not have a clearly articulated 
strategy for dealing with developments 
in the Asia Pacific region including the 
rise of China. The articulation of such a 
strategy that includes both hard and soft 
power components came out as the top 
Indian priority.
•	 Though Indian and US interests are 
increasingly aligned against China in 
many ways, India should not become 
a formal part of the US rebalance 
strategy. India should also make sure 
that it has the capabilities to deal with 
any problems with China on its own 
without having to depend on other 
countries. 
•	 India should continue to actively engage 
with China in all areas while continuing 
to be watchful about Chinese actions 
and intentions.
•	 India needs to be proactive in its 
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approach to the region especially with 
regard to the maritime domain. It must 
exploit emerging opportunities to send 
strong signals to all players, that it 
will preserve and protect its strategic 
interests. The absence of a clear ‘Look 
East’ strategy is currently hampering 
such efforts.
•	 In spite of the many problems within 
ASEAN, India should continue to engage 
actively and constructively with it.
•	 Apart from strengthening bilateral ties 
with countries like Russia India also 
needs to look at trilateral agreements 
with the countries to strengthen its 
strategic position.
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The International Strategic and Security 
Studies Programme (ISSSP) at NIAS is 
an interdisciplinary programme that 
seeks to combine science and technology, 
international relations, economics and 
political science in understanding the 
strategic and security environment of India 
and the world. Its objectives are to study the 
military-political and security developments, 
offer suggestions for promoting and ensuring 
India’s national security, study the impact of 
technology on security, implement projects, 
organise empirical conferences, and provide 
policy inputs on various issues. 
For more information, please visit http://
isssp.in/
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